Professor David Chalmers
ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences
Areas of expertise
- Philosophy Of Language 220313
- Philosophy Of Mind (Excl. Cognition) 220314
- Epistemology 220304
- Philosophy Of Cognition 220312
- Decision Theory 220302
- Metaphysics 220309
Biography
David Chalmers works in the philosophy of mind and in related areas of philosophy and cognitive science. He is especially interested in consciousness, but is also interested in artificial intelligence and computation, in philosophical issues about meaning and possibility, and in the foundations of cognitive science and of physics. David joined the RSSS as a Federation Fellow in August 2004 to establish the Centre for Consciousness - visit his homepage for comprehensive coverage of his work.
Publications
- Chalmers, D 2011, 'Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account', Nous, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 595-639.
- Chalmers, D 2010, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.
- Chalmers, D 2009, 'Ontological Anti-Realism', in D Manley,D Chalmers, R Wasserman (ed.), Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 77-129.
- Chalmers, D 2009, 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', in Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 313-335.
- Chalmers, D, Manley, D & Wasserman, R, eds, 2009, Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Chalmers, D & Hajek, A 2007, 'Ramsey + Moore = God', Analysis, vol. 67, no. 72, pp. 170-172.
- Chalmers, D 2006, 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap', in Torin Alter and Sven Walter (ed.), Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: new essays on consciousness and physicalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 167-195.
- Chalmers, D 2006, 'Two-dimensional semantics', in E. Lepore and B. Smith (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 574-607.
- Chalmers, D 2006, 'Perception and the fall from Eden', in T. Gendler, J. Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 49-125.
- Chalmers, D 2006, 'The foundations of two-dimensional semantics', in M. Garcia-Carpintero, J. Macia (ed.), Two-dimensional semantics: foundations and applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 55-140.
- Chalmers, D 2005, 'The Matrix as Metaphysics', in Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore The Matrix, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 132-176.
- Chalmers, D 2004, 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument', in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar (ed.), There's Something About Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, USA, pp. 269-298.
- Chalmers, D 2004, 'Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, pp. 182-190.
- Chalmers, D 2004, 'The Representational Character of Experience', in Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 153-181.
- Chalmers, D 2004, 'How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?', in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (3rd ed), MIT Press, Boston, pp. 1111-1119.
- Chalmers, D 2004, 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics', Philosophical Studies, vol. 118, no. 1-2, pp. 153-226.
- Chalmers, D 2003, 'The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief', in Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic (ed.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 220-272.
- Chalmers, D 2003, 'The Nature of Narrow Content', Philosophical Issues, vol. 13, pp. 46-66.
- Bayne, T & Chalmers, D 2003, 'What is the Unity of Consciousness?', in Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 23-58.
- Chalmers, D 2003, 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, USA, p. 45.
- Chalmers, D 2002, 'On Sense and Intension', Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 16, pp. 135-182.
- Chalmers, D 2002, 'The Components of Content', in David Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Chalmers, D 2002, 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (ed.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, UK, pp. 145-200.
- Chalmers, D 2002, 'The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox', Analysis, vol. 62, pp. 155-157.
- Chalmers, D, ed., 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, USA.
- Chalmers, D & Jackson, F 2001, 'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation', Philosophical Review, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 315-361.
- Chalmers, D 2000, 'What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?', in Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, MIT Press, Boston.
- Chalmers, D 1999, 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 59, pp. 473-493.
- Chalmers, D 1999, 'Precis of The Conscious Mind', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 435-438.
- Chalmers, D 1999, 'Is There Synonymy in Ockham's Mental Language?', in Paul Vincent Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, Cambridge University Press, UK.
